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ABSTRACT 
HIV Testing and Informed Consent: A Study of 
Physician Behavior 
John Robert Nienow 
1988 
The problem of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) epidemic and the advent of large-scale testing for 
antibodies to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) 
present unforeseen burdens to the creation of a beneficial 
doctor-patient relationship and confuse already difficult 
issues of confidentiality, duty to treat, and consent. 
This thesis investigates the role of informed consent 
in the context of HIV testing. Appeals have been made by 
several experts for informed consent before ordering HIV 
tests, but what this entails is unclear. No other blood 
test has elicited calls for such stringent disclosure by the 
health care provider. 
The legal doctrine of informed consent has evolved 
rapidly over the past 25 years, and a relative consensus of 
the physician's duty has emerged: a physician must 
disclose, according to varying standards set either by the 
"community of physicians" or a "reasonable lay person", the 
nature, benefits, risks, alternatives, and possible negative 
consequences of a proposed procedure. 
To determine whether physicians act in accordance with 
this legal standard in the case of HIV testing, an empirical 
study of the consent process was undertaken at Yale-New 
Haven Hospital. Twenty physicians ordering HIV tests over a 
two-week period were interviewed to assess the level of 
disclosure usually practiced when ordering HIV tests. Few 
physicians were found to have disclosed the relevant 
benefits (25% of physicians) or risks (30% of physicians) of 
HIV testing, and, using a created measure of disclosure, 
only three physicians (15%) were found to disclose at least 
an "average" amount of information in their usual practice. 
Given this general underreporting of information, steps 
should be taken to educate health care providers as to the 
relevant benefits and risks of HIV testing. The necessity 
of adequate disclosure should be emphasized. A commitment 
to protecting the interests of patients who undergo HIV 
testing through the communication of relevant information 
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Life is a battle in which we fall from 
wounds we receive in running away. 
William L. Sullivan 
The epidemic of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) has been called, by some, the most pressing medical 
issue of the twentieth century (Gallup poll conducted 
October 1987, 1987). Worldwide, more than 70,000 cases have 
been reported to the World Health Organization by 127 
countries (Von Reyn & Mann, 1987) and in the United States, 
by the end of 1987, some 27,909 were reported to have died, 
56% of the nearly 50,000 reported cases (Centers for Disease 
control, 1987b). According to federal health officials, one 
to one-and-a half million Americans are now asymptomatic 
carriers of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the 
causative agent in AIDS. Ill-prepared to handle these 
projected millions, our medical system in the coming years 
will have to stretch and adapt in ways we can only begin to 
estimate. Projections of the economic toll alone have been 
staggering (Cole & Lundberg, 1986). 
HI HHHI 
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Even more profound may be the epidemic's ultimate 
effect on the personal relationship developed between 
patient and practitioner. Already well-discussed issues of 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice have 
taken on new and different meanings in the context of AIDS. 
Surprisingly, little has been done to study the actual 
workings of the doctor-patient relationship in this context. 
This study will assess how physicians, in their 
interactions with patients, are responding to one facet of 
the epidemic: the use of a blood test to determine whether 
a patient has been exposed to the HIV. Unlike routine blood 
tests, which normally do not require the explicit consent of 
the patient tested, the anti-HIV antibody test (hereafter 
called the HIV test), because of its unique medical and 
social risks, has been deemed different enough to require 
such consent (Bayer et al., 1986). Many institutions will 
perform the test only after consent has been documented 
(Henry et al., 1988). 
This raises a host of questions about the use of 
informed consent: Are physicians in fact obtaining informed 
consent? For what reasons are physicians ordering the HIV 
test? What are the risks and benefits of the test that they 
are explaining to their patients? Who should be responsible 
for obtaining consent? Can physicians, who are not deemed 
"experts" in social or policy issues, be held liable for 
remote social risks not explained to patients? Should 
I 
I 
physicians have to include refusal of medical treatment 
(perhaps their own) as one of risks of the HIV test? 
3 
This thesis is divided into two parts: the first is a 
review of the ethical and legal basis for informed consent 
(as it particularly applies to HIV testing), and the second 
is an empirical study of the actual use of informed consent 
by physicians ordering HIV tests. The empirical section 
consists of the results of some 20 semi-structured 
interviews that were conducted with physicians after 
obtaining consent for an actual HIV test. These interviews 
are intended to address some of the questions asked above. 
■ 
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A. THE AIDS EPIDEMIC. 
On June 5, 1981, the Centers for Disease Control 
published a report from Los Angeles (Centers for Disease 
Control, 1981a) describing five new cases of Pneumocystis 
Carinii pneumonia in young homosexual males, a disease 
thought to inflict only those with a severe underlying 
immune disturbance. A month later, on July 3, 1981, another 
report was issued (Centers for Disease Control, 1981b) 
describing the appearance of a rare malignancy, Kaposi's 
sarcoma, in a similar population of patients. 
AIDS is now known to be the extreme clinical 
presentation on the spectrum of infection with HIV, and is 
technically a defined "syndrome" (the definition of which 
has recently changed [Centers for Disease Control, 1987d]), 
rather than a single "disease". The period of time between 
infection with HIV and the development of symptoms (if any) 
can be many years (Curran et al., 1988). 
HIV is known to infect various cells in the body, but 
primarily causes death through the infection and ultimate 
incapacitation of the immune system, allowing so-called 
"opportunistic" infections - infections normally warded off 
by a competent immune system - to take root (Fauci, 1988). 
The virus is believed to be transmitted in primarily 
three ways: during sexual contact; through parenteral 
exposure to blood and blood products; and from mother to 
child (Curran et al., 1988). There have been a few reports 
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of transmission of the virus to health care workers through 
both parenteral and mucous membrane exposure (Centers for 
Disease Control, 1987d). 
Given these modes of transmission, infection with HIV 
in the United States has remained confined to primarily two 
groups: Homosexual or bisexual men (65%); and intravenous 
drug users (17%). One percent of AIDS victims have been 
hemophiliacs, and 2% have been transfusion recipients 
(Curran et al., 1988). 
There is no current vaccine available to prevent 
infection with HIV, as well as few well-studied treatments 




B. ANTI-HIV ANTIBODY TESTING. 
With the discovery of an infectious etiology, AIDS 
researchers turned to the development of a routine blood 
test that would detect the presence of HIV infection. In 
March of 1985, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
announced the first licensing of a commercial test that 
would detect the presence of antibodies to virus particles 
in blood, allowing the mass screening of donated blood and 
plasma to prevent transfusion-related infection. 
Clinical use of the HIV screening test began in April, 
1985, and its use since that time has grown to include 
screening at clinics and hospitals, screening of distinct 
population groups (e.g., military recruits), and large scale 
anonymous testing at so-called "alternative" sites, 
developed largely out of the fear that high-risk individuals 
would seek testing by donating blood (Centers for Disease 
Control, 1986). 
The first test developed to detect the presence of HIV 
is known by the generic name of Enzyme-1inked Immunosorbent 
Assay (ELISA), which detects the presence of antibodies 
normally stimulated by the virus (Saxinger et al., 1983). 
Because this test originated from the desire to protect the 
nation's blood supply, the goal was to detect every truly- 
infected unit of blood donated; thus, the specificity of 
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the test was sacrificed to maintain a high sensitivity.-*- 
A recent report from the Centers for Disease Control 
evaluates the sensitivities and specificities of currently 
used ELISA tests (Centers for Disease Control, 1988). 
Sensitivities and specificities both greater than 99.0% are 
reported, a figure that is variable depending on the quality 
of the laboratory engaged in routine HIV screening. The 
normal procedure is for a "reactive" (or positive) ELISA 
test to be repeated, thus minimizing this laboratory error. 
A specificity greater than 99.0% poses no problems when 
screening groups with a high percentage of infected 
individuals, but the proportional number of falsely-positive 
individuals becomes larger in screening low-risk groups, 
sometimes far outnumbering the true-positives detected {The 
New York Times, Nov. 30, 1987). 
Because of the medical and social consequences of being 
labeled HIV antibody "positive", the Public Health Service 
has recommended, in addition to repeating the initially 
positive ELISA test, the use of an additional confirmatory 
test (Centers for Disease Control, 1987a). Most 
laboratories are using the Western Blot (Tsang et al., 
1983), a technique that is dependent upon the subjective 
interpretation of laboratory personnel in identifying a 
positive or negative result. If the manufacturer's strict 
interpretive criteria are used, the probability of either a 
^-Sensitivity is the probability that the test result will be 
reactive if the specimen is a true positive; specificity is 
the probability that the test will be non-reactive if the 
specimen is a true negative. 
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false-positive or a false negative result is extremely small 
(Centers for Disease Control, 1988). 
However, in clinical use on persons at low risk, as 
many as 15-20% of test results have been reported as 
"indeterminate". Recommendations for standardization of the 
use of the Western Blot have been published (Association of 
State and Territorial Public Health Directors, 1987), but 
the extent of adherence to these is unknown. The problem of 
accuracy is compounded by the fact that many laboratories 
use, for expense reasons, a Western Blot test unlicensed by 
the FDA, thus escaping the rigorous scrutiny and 
standardization that licensed tests must meet (Centers for 
Disease Control, 1988). A demonstrable false-positive rate 
of <0.001% can be achieved with sequential ELISA and Western 
Blot testing if the manufacturer's guidelines and other 
quality controls are adhered to. A nationwide evaluation of 
the use of HIV antibody testing has been initiated by the 
CDC's Training and Laboratory Program Office and Center for 
Infectious Diseases in an attempt to address these issues 
(Performance evaluation program, 1987). 
In addition, the CDC has stressed the importance of 
having a "clear understanding of the significance of the 
test results and the potential pitfalls of the testing 
process" (Centers for Disease Control, 1988). 
It is important to stress that the HIV antibody test 
was developed to detect infection (via the presence of 
indicator proteins) in donated blood; its use in diagnosing 
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and treating patients is more limited. One author (Bayer et 
al., 1986) has noted several uses of the test in a clinical 
setting: it allows clinicians to monitor the potential 
infectiousness of their patients (antibody-positive 
individuals are presumed infectious); it may be useful in 
establishing risks to the patient when contemplating 
immunosuppressive therapy; it may provide epidemiologists 
with data to track the disease and to describe its natural 
history; and, finally, and perhaps most importantly, it may 
be used to provide information to individuals supporting 
their voluntary modifications of behavior. 
The use of the HIV antibody test to screen certain 
large populations has been suggested. Recent Illinois 
legislation now requires HIV tests of all couples before 
marriage (Wilkerson, 1988), straining the state's laboratory 
facilities, and driving some couples to cross state lines to 
be married. The number of applications for marriage in Cook 
County has dropped by more than 50% since the inception of 
testing. Only two states, Illinois and Louisiana, currently 
require such premarital HIV testing. 
Screening of all current members of, and applicants to, 
the US Armed Forces began approximately two years ago 
(Pentagon AIDS Testing Finds 5,890 Infected, 1988). During 
that time, the Defense Department has tested nearly four 
million people, and has identified 5,890 as HIV antibody 
positive. The current detection rate of 1.5 cases of 
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infection per 1000 people screened, has remained constant 
throughout the duration of the testing. 
In a controversial recommendation. Surgeon General 
C. Everett Koop recently recommended screening every student 
at a major urban university (student body of approximately 
25,000) in order to determine the epidemiology of HIV 
infection in college-age adults (Jamieson, 1988). The 
testing would be anonymous, and the students tested would 
not be provided with the results. 
Dr. James 0. Mason, director of the Centers for Disease 
Control, announced in December, 1987, a plan to randomly 
test more than 50,000 households in 30 major cities 
throughout the nation, in an attempt to determine how 
quickly the virus is spreading (Boffey, 1987). Blood 
samples would be collected on an anonymous basis at selected 
hospitals and clinics for sexually transmitted diseases, 
drug addiction, tuberculosis, pregnant women and family 
planning. When this testing becomes operational in May, 
1988, some 1.6 million people will be having their blood 
tested annually for the presence of HIV antibody. Combining 
this with other large-scale screenings of population groups 
already under way, over 7.7 million people will be having 
their blood tested annually by mid-1988. 
These current and future testing programs show that the 
social problems produced by the HIV testing dilemmas only 
promise to grow. The future implications of seropositivity, 
both medically and socially, are unknown, but with such a 
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large group of Americans undergoing routine HIV testing, it 
seems prudent to investigate the decision-making process in 
greater detail. Historically, medical practitioners have 
not always retained their patients' interests above their 
own (Zuger & Miles, 1987), and thus both patient and doctor 
need information as to the most appropriate course of action 
in an environment where fear and intolerance have the 
potential to dominate. 
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C. GOALS OF THIS STUDY. 
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the 
nature of decision-making in the setting of HIV testing, and 
to do this, the problem has been broken into two parts. 
The first is to view the process of informed consent in 
relation to its use in other clinical settings. Through the 
development of ethical and legal theory, there has emerged a 
relatively uniform doctrine of informed consent which serves 
to guide physicians and their patients in decision-making. 
The principles that have evolved in the law can be applied 
to the setting of HIV testing (although this, too, is 
arguable). The first part of this study is therefore a 
retelling of the history of informed consent, placing the 
current problem in its historical and legal context. 
The second purpose of the study is to assess the actual 
behavior of physicians in working out a decision to test for 
HIV. The essence of an "informed" consent from the 
physician's perspective consists of disclosure, and 
therefore, the scope of risk and benefit disclosure, 
especially when those risks and benefits are uncertain and 
controversial, is a necessary item of investigation. Do 
physicians behave in a uniform manner when ordering HIV 
tests? Is there a uniform level of disclosure - a consensus 
of the community of physicians - which a physician 
ordinarily should follow in disclosing information regarding 
HIV testing? What items of disclosure are necessary for an 
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informed consent? To begin to answer these questions, one 
needs to enter the realm of actual clinical decision-making, 
and thus the second part of this study is a retrospective 
sampling of actual disclosure conversations as reported by 
the physicians themselves. 
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II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN ETHICAL THEORY 
AND LEGAL HISTORY, 
Arguments for the doctrine of informed consent can be 
found in both ethical theory and legal history, and it is 
within the realms of these two disciplines, law and 
morality, that the vocabulary of informed consent has been 
framed. Although by no means separable, these two 
approaches have, in recent years, come to focus on different 
players within the doctor-patient relationship: the law 
centering on the duties of physicians and, necessarily, the 
liabilities resulting from failure to discharge those 
duties; and ethical theory centering on the rights of 
patients. 
In this section, I will present the basic ethical 
principles upon which the theory of informed consent is 
built, and in the following section, I will show, through 
landmark cases, how the law has come to shape the actual 
workings of informed consent. 
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A. THE ETHICAL BASIS OF INFORMED CONSENT. 
Ethical theory has as its a priori postulates certain 
principles upon which applied ethical reasoning takes place. 
Although the creation and definition of these principles is 
a controversial matter, Beauchamp and Childress (1983) have 
outlined what they consider to be the four essential 
principles of ethical discourse: the principles of 
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. When, 
in a given circumstance, these principles conflict, it is 
through weighing and balancing, the substance of ethical 
reasoning itself, that one arrives at an informed 
conelusion. 
In various discussions on the contributions of these 
principles, it is clear that one principle, the respect for 
autonomy, has contributed more to the philosophical 
groundings of informed consent than any other. Derived from 
the Greek words autos (self) and nomos (rule or law), 
autonomy has come to refer to personal self-governance: the 
personal rule of the self, based on an adequate 
understanding, that remains free from the controlling 
influences of others. As Immanuel Kant (1948) expressed, 
autonomous persons are to be treated as ends in themselves, 
determining their own destinies, and are not to be treated 
merely as a means to the ends of others. In the context of 
informed consent, it is autonomous choice, the exercise of 
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capacities to be independent and in control, with which we 
are most concerned. 
Faden and Beauchamp (1986) properly point out the 
limits in defining the precise obligations that the 
principle of autonomy entails in the consent context. Where 
independent choice conflicts with public good and with the 
consumption of scarce societal resources, or where it leads 
to harm to another, other principles must come into play. 
The principle of beneficence is most often given as a 
second supporting justification for informed consent. Faden 
and Beauchamp (1986) describe four elements to the principle 
of beneficence: 1. One ought not to inflict evil or harm. 
2. One ought to prevent evil or harm. 3. One ought to 
remove evil or harm. 4. One ought to do or promote good. 
Thus, the principle of beneficence is often seen as 
encompassing the avoidance of harm, as well as the active 
doing of good. In fact, the celebrated maxim of medical 
ethics primum non nocere - "above all, do no harm" - 
reinforces the idea that beneficence, in medicine, is 
demonstrated by avoiding harm. Practically speaking, all 
physicians know and realize that harm must, at times, be 
inflicted for the good of the patient, and it is this 
balancing of inflicted harm with potential good that must be 
maintained. 
In the informed consent context, it is the balancing of 
the professional’s desire to do good, or avoid harm, with 
the patient's own understanding of the good or harm 
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involved, that must be maintained. The concept of medical 
paternalism provides justification for the overriding of 
patient decisions in cases where the good of the patient is 
at stake. 
Many legal cases have allowed "therapeutic privilege", 
which is the purposeful withholding of information by the 
physician, as an exception to patient autonomy. Inherent in 
the "therapeutic privilege" is the idea that, given certain 
circumstances, full disclosure can actually harm, rather 
than help, the patient. Whole treatises (see VanDeVeer, 
1986) have been written in an attempt to define when, or if, 
this privilege should be involved. Although authors have 
spent considerable time illuminating the assumptions 
underlying the perceived need for withholding information, 
the legal system has continued to support physician 
judgement in deciding when to withhold. 
Authors have differing opinions as to what other 
principles play a predominant role in the issue of informed 
consent. Faden and Beauchamp (1986) discuss the principle 
of justice, by which they mean the fair and equitable 
treatment of all persons. Issues of distribution of medical 
resources and the validity of claims to a right to health 
care, are often given as examples of how the principle of 
justice enters into ethical discourse. In the context of 
consent, it is often broader questions of research on human 
subjects where this principle enters in. Can prisoners give 
valid consent to participate in research when incarceration 
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itself affects autonomous decision-making? Are the burdens 
of research equitably distributed when we use a ready pool 
of volunteers (people institutionalized for one reason or 
another), or when financial remuneration is offered as an 
incentive to participation? 
Other authors, Beauchamp and Childress (1983), discuss 
the principle of utility in the context of informed consent. 
Utility is the idea that something should be done, not for 
the right or wrong involved, but because social benefit, 
outweighing harm, can be derived from such action. 
Requiring consent, they argue, will maximize social good - 
it will protect and benefit patients and professionals 
alike, it will alleviate public fears (especially about 
research), and it will encourage self-scrutiny by physicians 
and investigators. This is opposed to the idea that 
autonomy guarantees personal decision-making regardless of 
the outcome. Robert Veatch has argued that autonomy 
justifies informed consent "not to facilitate social 
benefits, but as a check against them", since persons have 
rights to information and decision-making that are 
independent of the social utility involved. 
In conclusion, we see that the philosophical basis for 
informed consent resides primarily in two central 
principles: the concept of personal autonomy; and the 
desire to promote good, and avoid harm, in the practice of 
medical care. Issues of justice and social utility are, in 
turn, balanced against these primary principles. 
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B. THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED 
CONSENT. 
1. COMMON LAW AND THEORIES OF LIABILITY. 
Legal doctrines arise in significant part from moral 
principles. However, the law faces its own internal limits: 
the structure and function of the adversary system, the 
problems of enforcement and remedies, and the practical 
issues arising from the use of case-by-case adjudication. 
Accordingly, the development of the legal doctrine of 
informed consent has carried with it the particularities of 
the branch of law known as common law. Common law is that 
body of unwritten guidelines, fashioned and molded over time 
through individual court opinions. 
In common law, the moral principle of autonomy has 
become embodied in the battery theory of liability. This is 
the principle under which a person is held liable for the 
unauthorized physical contact of another person, and derives 
from the belief that all people have the right to decide 
whether they wished to be "touched". It is important that 
there need not be any injury sustained in this unpermitted 
contact for a successful claim of battery to be brought - it 
is the unconsented act itself that is wrong. The moral 
principle of autonomy has become, under the theory of 
battery, the legal right to self-determination. 
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In addition, we see the grounding of consent in another 
theory of liability in common law - the negligence theory of 
liability. Under negligence, one is held liable when, in 
the course of discharging a legal duty to another, some 
injury is brought about by unintentional or careless action, 
or through the omission of an act. Often, this duty is 
measured by the standard of the reasonable person, an 
abstraction representing the community consensus of 
acceptable behavior. Medical malpractice is one type of 
professional negligence, and it is by the standard of the 
reasonable physician that one is judged under the negligence 
theory of liability. 
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2. CONSENT AND BATTERY LIABILITY. 
The legal history of consent really begins in the early 
twentieth century. There are some cases before this time 
that deal peripherally with the issues of consent, but it is 
clear that this was not an intended concern of the law, and 
that nobody - judges, doctors, and the public alike - had 
ideas that doctors should be informing patients, in an open 
and complete manner, before initiating treatment. See 
Slater v. Baker and Stapleton (1767), Carpenter v. Blake 
(1878), and Wells v. World's Dispensary Medical Association 
(1890) as examples of consent as a peripheral issue. 
There are two landmark cases in the early twentieth 
century, Pratt v. Davis (1906) and Schloendorff v. The 
Society of the Mew York Hospital (1914), that are credited 
with establishing the battery theory of liability as a means 
of redressing the lack of patient consent. 
In the Pratt case, a forty year old epileptic woman 
solicited a Dr. Pratt for advice and treatment concerning 
her chronic condition. After his examination. Dr. Pratt 
concluded that Mrs. Davis' ovaries and uterus had to be 
removed, which he subsequently did, without informing his 
patient of what was going to be done. 
In his testimony. Dr. Pratt stated of Mrs. Davis, 
that he "wished her to come to the operating room without 
violence", and so had spoken only of his intention to repair 
some cervical and rectal tears. He had done this, Dr. Pratt 
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insisted, because of his openly admitted belief that "when a 
patient places herself in the care of a surgeon for 
treatment without [express limitations] upon his authority, 
she thereby in law consents that he may perform such 
operation as in his best judgement is proper and essential 
to her welfare". 
The court resoundingly rejected this idea, stating that 
physicians and surgeons were forbidden from violating the 
fundamental and inviolable right of bodily integrity, 
without the express consent of the patient. The assertion 
of implied consent was an inadequate argument, and could be 
claimed only in certain extreme situations, primarily 
unforeseeable emergencies. 
In the succeeding and more influential case of 
Schloendorff v. The Society of New York Hospitals (1914), a 
female patient had consented to an examination under 
anesthesia for uterine fibroids, but had explicitly stated 
that she wanted no operation performed. The surgeon ignored 
the patient's request, and proceeded with a hysterectomy. 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in his classic opinion, eloquently 
laid out the rationale for informed consent as an expression 
of patient self-determination: 
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Every human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient's 
consent commits an assault, for which he is 
liable in damages. 
This opinion had a tremendous impact in the developing 
consent law. It served to focus attention on the idea that 
any unauthorized treatment by a physician constituted a 
battery, regardless of the skill with which the treatment 
was administered or any beneficial effect the treatment may 
have had. 
As Katz (1984) points out, the opinion was deficient in 
addressing practical concerns of consent, such as the proper 
limits of physician disclosure, but the firm grounding of 
self-determination as a legal basis for consent - echoing 




3 "INFORMED" CONSENT AND NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY. 
The next major development in consent law did not occur 
until forty years later. Until the case of Salgo v. Leland 
Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees (1957), most 
consent cases cited the opinion of Justice Cardozo in 
Schloendorff v. The Society of New York Hospitals (1914) 
that physicians had a duty to obtain the minimal consent of 
a patient before "invading" their person. But now, a new 
element was added - the idea that a physician had to duty to 
disclose certain information, and that without such 
disclosure, consent cannot be considered valid. 
In 1954, Martin Salgo underwent translumbar aortography 
for a suspected obstruction of the abdominal aorta. The 
following morning, he awoke paralyzed from the waist down. 
He claimed that the paralysis was due to the negligent 
performance of the angiography by his physicians, but then 
appended a claim that the physicians had failed to warn him 
of the risks inherent in the procedure. 
Justice Bray spoke for the court when he upheld the 
plaintiff's claim, stating that physicians had the duty to 
disclose "any facts which are necessary to form the basis of 
an intelligent consent by the patient to proposed 
treatment". 
For the first time, the phrase "informed consent" was 
used, denoting this new requirement for physician-disclosed 
information: "In discussing the element of risk a certain 
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amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the 
full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent." 
Thus, physicians were now not only required to inform 
patients that they were to be "touched" (avoiding a claim of 
battery), but they were also to inform patients of the 
attendant benefits, risks, and alternatives to such 
"touching". The opinion was confusing in the fact that 
Justice Bray left it up to the discretion of the physician 
to decide what should be deemed "full" disclosure. Katz 
(1984) considers this exemplary of the ambiguity which would 
pervade succeeding opinions in their inability to resolve 
the dilemma of how to disclose. 
In addition, the opinion in the Salgo case did not 
ground the new requirement for "informed" consent in either 
battery or negligence law. This case was brought as a 
negligence claim, although the cases cited as supporting the 
opinion were all battery cases (including Schloendorff). 
While the court was adding a new element to consent as it 
had been grounded in battery law, it was allowing for the 
evolution of a doctrine that would combine both battery and 
negligence theories of liability into a single unified 
theory of consent. 
This opportunity to formulate a doctrine of consent in 
both battery and negligence was not realized in subsequent 
decisions. Instead, the courts siezed upon the late entry 
of negligence liability as a justification for consent and 
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expanded the role of the professional in determining what 
"informed" consent should mean. 
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4. THE "PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE" STANDARD. 
Whereas Salgo had combined elements of both battery and 
negligence in its opinion, the Kansas Supreme Court, in 
Natanson v. Kline (1960), moved the justification for 
consent much more squarely into the camp of negligence 
liability. 
Irma Natanson had suffered extensive injuries from 
cobalt treatment used in conjunction with mastectomy to 
treat her breast cancer. She sued her radiologist. 
Dr. John R. Kline, claiming that he had been negligent in 
both administering the treatment, and in failing to inform 
her of the consequent risks and hazards. 
Thus, the patient had alleged negligence only, and the 
court upheld this, stating (as in Salgo) that physicians had 
the obligation to "disclose and explain to the patient in 
language as simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, 
the probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps 
the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions 
within the body." 
The standard for determining the adequacy of disclosure 
was adopted from existing negligence theory: "The expert 
testimony of a medical witness is required to establish 
whether such disclosures are in accordance with those which 
a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same 
or similar circumstances." This has become known as the 
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"professional practice" standard, and is generally the 
standard adhered to in most jurisdictions today. 
The law had thus found an easy way to determine the 
extent of disclosure. The "professional practice" standard 
left the matter to physicians themselves, thus relieving the 
courts of criticisms that judges or juries were making 
"medical" decisions. 
Many drawbacks to the "professional practice" standard 
have been cited (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). First, the 
standard assumes that there exists a consensus within the 
community of physicians. This is difficult to prove. 
Second, the standard tends to perpetuate mediocrity amongst 
physicians. It allows doctors to legally give inferior or 
insubstantial information to patients justifiably, since 
that is the level of information that all physicians are 
disclosing. And finally, the chief objection of the 
standard is that is tends to undermine patient autonomy, 




5. THE "REASONABLE PERSON” STANDARD. 
Our remaining landmark case in consent law, Canterbury 
v. Spence (1972), established a new standard for physician 
disclosure, leading to the overthrow of the "professional 
practice" standard in certain jurisdictions. 
In 1959, a young patient underwent a laminectomy for 
severe back pain. Twenty four hours after the operation, 
the patient fell out of his hospital bed and immediately 
suffered paralysis below the waist. He claimed to not have 
been warned of the 1% risk of paralysis that accompanies a 
laminectomy. 
Justice Robinson of the Washington D.C. Court of 
Appeals, in finding for the plaintiff, reiterated the 
principle of self-determination in decisions regarding the 
dispensation of one’s own body. Although the court upheld 
the plaintiff's negligence claim, it struck down the 
standard by which disclosure was to be judged. Justice 
Robinson could not agree that "the patient's cause of action 
is dependent upon the existence and nonperformance of a 
relevant professional tradition". The new standard was to 
consist of that information necessary for a "reasonable 
person" to make an informed decision. 
Thus, the court for the first time rejected the 
unquestioned authority of the medical professional in favor 
of a fuller understanding of doctor-patient communication. 
Physicians were deemed to have no more insight than a 
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reasonable lay person, once the appropriate medical 
information was communicated, in coming to an appropriate 
decision. Note, however, that this is not a "subjective" 
standard: that is, physicians were not required to disclose 
according to their particular patients' informational needs 
and desires. Instead, "on the basis of his medical training 
and experience [the physician] can sense how the average, 
reasonable patient expectably would react." The 
significance of any particular risk or benefit is measured 
in terms of what significance a "reasonable" person would 
attach to the particular risk or benefit, rather than the 
particular patient in question. 
Proponents of this standard of disclosure would 
generally regard the patient's autonomy (as opposed to the 
physician's beneficence) as deserving of more protection. 
Others have cited problems with this standard: Given the 
difficulty in ascertaining what a "reasonable" person might 
require, the standard has been deemed impossible to satisfy. 
Courts have so far been unable to articulate what the 
standard should mean (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986). Thus, 
physicians have been left with little guidance in 
formulating a standard of disclosure. 
The doctrine of informed consent has had a rapid 
evolution in the law. In a short amount of time, consent 
has moved from mere "nodding of the head" to a physician's 
proposed action, to an elaborate measure of specific items 
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of disclosure. Whether these developments have had any real 
effect on the way doctors communicate with patients is 
another matter altogether. Certainly the awareness of 
patients' informational needs has changed: no more can 




C. HIV TESTING AND INFORMED CONSENT. 
Given the social and medical risks of having an HIV 
test performed, many authors have urged that informed 
consent be obtained before the test is ordered (Bayer et al, 
1986; Goldsmith, 1987; Eickhoff, 1988; Sherer, 1988). There 
has been, however, no explicit guidelines as to what 
"informed consent" in the context of HIV testing really 
means. 
No litigation has yet arisen merely on the claim of 
lack of informed consent before HIV testing. Personal 
communication with the Lambda Legal Defense Fund and the 
National Gay Rights Advocates, both which are organizations 
heavily involved in HIV-related litigation, turned up no 
pending cases involving informed consent and HIV testing. 
The American Psychiatric Association, in their Position 
Statement on AIDS (1986), has given the most complete 
statement to date on HIV testing and informed consent. They 
state: 
The confidentiality of persons undergoing 
HIV serologic testing for clinical and 
research purposes should be protected, and 
all information obtained including 
identifying data and test results should be 
used only for the purposes explicitly stated 
in the informed consents and releases of 
information. When testing is performed for 
clinical or research purposes, attention to 
the psychiatric implications must be 
considered pre- and post-testing and the 
possible adverse consequences of serologic 




Thus, this statement would seem to imply that the 
consent process should, at a minimum, include a discussion 
of the purposes, the psychiatric implications, and the 
possible adverse consequences of HIV testing. What follows 
is a discussion of these relevant adverse consequences. 
The HIV test is a procedure performed by routine 
venipuncture, and thus carries with it the known medical 
risks of phlebotomy (Robb, 1985). Although serious nerve 
compression and even cardiac arrest have occurred, less dire 
consequences such as hematoma, pain, swelling, and changes 
in sensation were more frequently reported. These risks are 
considered of such minimal significance that they need not 
be reported to patients (in the clinical setting). 
The psychological risks of HIV testing have been well 
documented (Nichols, 1987; Holland & Tross, 1985). These 
include anxiety, minor and major depressions, and suicide 
attempts (Temoshok et al, 1987; Beckett et al, 1986). In 
many of these cases, the effects may be severe, immediate, 
and irreversible. 
Other problems have arisen in the area of employment. 
Loss of jobs, or refusal of employment, has occurred 
following disclosure of test results or even disclosure of 
seeking the test (Stempel et al., 1987; Douglas, et al., 
1987). Pierce & VanDeVeer (1988) report that in New York 
City, some local leaders have called for the mandatory 
screening of all teachers, health care workers, and barbers 
in order to prevent the employment of those that carry the 

34 
HIV. Similarly, in Dade County, Florida, county supervisors 
have promoted the screening of all food handlers so that 
those who are antibody positive could be excluded from jobs. 
These reports, along with the above mentioned screening 
by the Defense Department of all members of the armed 
forces, show that calls for exclusion in the workplace for 
those infected with HIV will continue to be a possible 
adverse consequence of HIV testing. 
Similar problems revolve around the health and life 
insurance industries. Two states, California and New York, 
have moved to prohibit the use of HIV testing to screen 
potential insurees (Sullivan, 1988). In eight states - 
Minnesota, Connecticut, Indiana, Florida, North Dakota, 
Montana, Wisconsin, and Nebraska - pools have been created 
to guarantee coverage to people whose initial applications 
for health insurance are refused because of risk factors or 
preexisting health conditions, with twenty other states 
considering similar legislation. With the number of new 
AIDS cases rising dramatically, the costs entailed will also 
rise, meaning that this issue will only become more heated. 
Problems with false results of HIV testing have already 
been discussed. It is important to remember that as the 
prevalence of the virus in the population tested declines, 
the proportion of false results increases. Thus, how much 
of a risk one encounters in being falsely labeled HIV 
positive is dependent on many variables. 
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Issues of privacy and confidentiality are intimately 
involved in HIV testing. Many states are considering 
legislation that would identify and track both victims of 
the disease and carriers of the virus, even though the 
Centers for Disease Control have labeled this a costly and 
intrusive mistake (Gruson, 1987). The California Medical 
Association voted in March, 1987 to support a proposal that 
would allow doctors in that state to tell the spouses of 
carriers of the HIV about their partner's antibody status. 
And in Illinois legislation already being considered, 
physicians, hospitals, laboratories, blood centers and other 
health care centers would be required to report the names of 
HIV carriers to the state, in addition to providing the 
names to school officials and employers. 
Finally, other uncertain risks are present. Public 
officials have called for the quarantine of infected persons 
(Hagen et al., 1988). School boards have barred 
seropositive children from the classroom. Ministers have 
excluded infected children from the church (Gianelli, 1987). 
Some medical personnel have refused to provide care to 
infected patients (Richardson et al., 1987). How people 
will respond both to the reality of this disease, and the 




III, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INFORMED CONSENT AND HIV 
TESTING, 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature 
of informed consent as it is used in conjunction with HIV 
testing at the Yale-New Haven Hospital (YNHH). Before HIV 
tests are performed at the YNHH central laboratory facility, 
physicians must certify in writing that patient consent has 
been obtained. This provides an ideal setting to assess 
exactly what information physicians feel is necessary to 
disclose to obtain valid patient consent. 
One of the legal standards for consent relies on the 
"community of physicians" to determine what information 
should be disclosed. Does such a standard exist for HIV 
testing? Are physicians uniformly discussing the benefits, 
risks, and negative consequences of such testing? The 
determination of a standard of disclosure for HIV testing 
was a major goal of this study. 
An additional benefit of the investigation was the 
profiling of HIV testing as it is performed at YNHH: How 
often is the test being used? By how many physicians? What 
spectrum of physicians is using the test, and for what 
purposes? 
Finally, the study would possibly heighten the 
awareness of those physicians using the HIV test. 

37 
Physicians, through their interactions with the 
investigator, would be made more conscious of the attendant 
benefits and risks of HIV testing, and therefore would be 
more likely to treat their subsequent disclosures with this 
information in mind. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW. 
The review of the pertinent literature will consist of 
two parts: first, a review of the major empirical studies 
dealing with the more general issues of informed consent; 
and, secondly, a review of empirical assessments of the 
attitudes and behaviors of health professionals in their 
interactions with AIDS patients. 
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1. A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL INFORMED CONSENT STUDIES. 
One author has described four elements necessary to a 
valid informed consent (Beauchamp & Childress, 1983): 1. 
Disclosure of information; 2. Comprehension of 
information; 3. Voluntariness of consent; and, 4. 
Competence to consent. Empirical studies on consent have 
focused on two of these elements: namely, the disclosure 
and comprehension of information. Each of these, in its own 
right, is available to empiric study. 
Thus, studies on the practical use of informed consent 
are centered on either physicians alone - what they are 
saying to patients - or on patients alone - what they are 
understanding of what has been told to them. There are few 
parallel studies that attempt to look at both disclosure and 
comprehension at the same time. 
This review will therefore concentrate on the landmark 
studies in each of the these three relevant categories: 1. 
Studies focusing on physician disclosure; 2. Studies 
focusing on patient comprehension; and, 3. Studies 
focusing simultaneously on physician disclosure and patient 
comprehension. Empirical studies in some of these 
categories are limited both in number and scope (Miesel & 
Roth, 1981), and are therefore included primarily for 
historical and methodological interest. 
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a. Studies focusing on physician disclosure. 
Hershey (1969) 
Published in 1969 as a research monograph by Nathan 
Hershey and Stanley Bushkoff of the University of 
Pittsburgh, this study is important primarily because it is 
the first systematic attempt to investigate disclosure 
practices, and it thus pioneered much of the methodology 
that is used today. 
The study was divided into two parts. In the first, a 
questionnaire on hypothetical patients requiring two 
separate orthopedic procedures was given to 22 surgeons 
known personally to the author. Eleven of the 22 responded. 
Using this group as a "test" population, the authors, in the 
second part of the study, sent out a large number of created 
consent forms to surgeons at six institutions. The consent 
form, which was to be completed at the time the surgeon 
obtained consent, included questions about the purpose and 
nature of the contemplated procedure, the risk and benefits 
of the procedure, and a separate consent for the 
administration of anesthesia. Usable responses were 
obtained from only ten surgeons from a single institution, 
representing a total of 256 patient encounters. 
No definite disclosure pattern was evident from the 
results of the preliminary investigation. The second study 
yielded the following results: 1. A fairly consistent 
standard of disclosure already existed amongst surgeons, to 
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a greater extent than they realized or admitted; 
2. Disclosure practices that used a consent form similar to 
the one used in the study would not lead to an interminable 
question and answer session between surgeon and patient; 
3. Patients would not be upset by the disclosure process 
and the consent from, leading to refusal of the proposed 
surgical treatment; and 4. Adequate disclosure is not a 
time consuming process, and that, "for the majority of 
patients, the disclosure process... can be completed in less 
than ten minutes." These questions were important as the 
use of standardized consent forms had just begun. 
Given the poor response rate from the surgeons 
approached by the investigators, few reliable conclusions 
about the actual practice of informed consent can be drawn. 
The primary contribution of the study has been its 
investigation of the methodologies available for the 
empirical study of informed consent. Succeeding studies 
(Rosoff, 1976) have used this study as a guide, and in many 
ways, it serves as a model for the present study on HIV 
testing and informed consent. 
Hagman (1970) 
Donald Hagman, a professor of law at UCLA, distributed 
a questionnaire containing nine hypothetical cases to all 
registrants for a series of seminars held by the UCLA 
Schools of Law and Medicine. Following each case, a series 
of questions was posed: Was the resolution of the case 
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proper as a matter of good medical practice? As a matter of 
ethics? As a matter of law? 
Similarly, questionnaires were sent to 300 physicians 
in Minnesota, and to 400 physicians in California. Not all 
questionnaires contained the same hypothetical cases. For 
each of 26 cases presented, the number of total respondents 
(from the seminars, from Minnesota, and from California) 
varied from 34 to 184. 
Hagman's interest in the study lay in determining 
whether legal proscriptions for physicians' behavior in 
obtaining informed consent were at odds with good medical 
and ethical practice. He concluded that they were not. In 
addition, he concluded that the law did not cause "bad 
medicine", but that disclosures that were medically sound 
were also legally acceptable. 
This study highlights some of the problems in informed 
consent research, i,e. the difficulty in obtaining a 
representative study sample, and the difficulty in ascribing 
conclusions to data collected from a large, non-uniform 
series of hypothetical cases. In addition, this study 
measures, as hypotheticals do, what an actor would do, 
rather than what was actually done. Physicians' attitudes 
toward disclosure, rather than physician behavior, were the 
true subjects of this study. 
These two studies, therefore, are significant primarily 
for their introduction of two methods of study to the field 
of informed consent: 1. The use of self-administered 
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questionnaires; and 2. The use of hypotheticals in 
assessing physician behavior. The actual results of the 
study are of limited interest, given the low response rate 
and the changing legal nature of the doctrine since that 
time. 
The final study investigating the nature of disclosure 
is a much broader and ambitious project with more reliable 
results. Many features of this study, such as the use of a 
ranking scale to study frequency of disclosure of specific 
items, were used in the current study. 
Rosoff (1976) 
A much larger scale study of physician practices in 
informed consent was undertaken by Arnold Rosoff of the 
University of Pennslyvania in 1976. In this study, a 
questionnaire containing 39 questions relating to informed 
consent was sent to physicians of two specialties (internal 
medicine and surgery) in certain purposefully selected 
states (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, 
California, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia). 
The questionnaire asked physicians about the frequency 
with which they discussed 21 areas of treatment information 
with their patients, including such basic legal components 
of informed consent as the diagnosis, the nature of the 
procedure, the risks and benefits of the procedure, and the 
alternatives to the procedure. The frequency of discussion 
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of each item could be recorded as: always, usually, rarely, 
or never. 
As expected with this type of study, Rosoff obtained a 
low response rate of 24%, and thus was unable to make any 
claims that the sample represented the "typical American 
physician". Physicians reported that they very frequently 
would disclose to patients those items that the law would 
regard as mandatory subjects of disclosure. 
Grouping together answers of "always" and "usually" as 
"commonly disclosed", the survey found that: 1. 98% of 
responding physicians reported commonly disclosing the 
diagnosis and prognosis of a patient's condition; 
2. 99% the nature or purpose of the recommended treatment; 
3. 91% the risk attending the procedure; and 4. 87% the 
negative consequences or side effects that are certain or 
fairly likely to attend the proposed procedure. 
Given these impressive figures, one must look closely 
to how the data were obtained. In this case, a small number 
of highly motivated physicians (who are, perhaps, more 
motivated in discussing informed consent with their 
patients) completed a lengthy questionnaire. And again, as 
in the Hershey study, what is being measured is not what 
physicians, in fact, did, but rather, what physicians say 
they did. 
Nevertheless, the Rosoff study represented a major leap 
in informed consent research: it attempted, on a national 
scale, to assess the effect of the evolving legal doctrine 
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of consent on actual physician behavior. This study set a 
new standard in scope, in detail, and certainly in ambition. 
b. Studies focusing on patient comprehension. 
Robinson (1976) 
This is an example of a study designed to assess what 
patients recall of a relatively standardized disclosure. 
Dr. Gregory Robinson, a surgeon in private practice in New 
York City, tape-recorded informed consent disclosure 
conversations with approximately 200 of his patients. His 
associate. Dr. Avram Merav, questioned selected patients 
from this group some four to six months later as to their 
recollection of the disclosure conversation. 
Patients were found to have remembered spontaneously 
only 29% of the substance of the disclosure. This figure 
rose to 42% when patients were prompted with particular 
details. 
Although centered on the comprehension element of 
informed consent, this study presents a unique and useful 
method for the empiric assessment of disclosure - the tape¬ 
recording of actual disclosure conversations. The perceived 





Also pertaining to the patient's comprehension of 
disclosure elements, these two studies were designed to 
investigate patients' reactions to the disclosure of risks 
associated with angiography. 
A total of 232 patients referred for angiography (of 
any vessel) were given a short questionnaire that 
accompanied the explicit disclosure for angiography. The 
results from this questionnaire showed that, for a large 
number of patients, the explication of risks pertaining to a 
procedure made them more comfortable with going ahead with 
that procedure. A small number of patients (2%) refused the 
procedure after the presentation of its attendant risks. 
Alfidi concluded that the fear that patients would 
become uncomfortable or refuse procedures if given all 
pertinent risk information was largely unfounded, and that 
in fact patients became more comfortable with more 
information. 
The companion study, in 1975, assessed whether 
patients, after having been informed that a procedure had 
"significant hazards associated with it," would desire 
further information regarding those hazards. The results of 
this study contradicted the 1971 study in that 176 of 275 
patients declined further information about risks. 
Alfidi concluded that the difference was primarily in 
how risk information was presented: if patients are given 
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this information, they are glad for it; if they must ask 
for risk information, they would rather not have it. 
Rosenberg (1973) 
Another investigation of patients' attitudes toward 
disclosure was undertaken by Sidney Rosenberg of the 
Permanente Medical Group in San Francisco, who polled 100 of 
his patients whether disclosure of risks and negative 
consequences of a cerebral arteriogram would cause them to 
refuse the procedure. Rosenberg's patients answered this in 
the hypothetical, none of them ever having had to actually 
consider the procedure. 
Similar to Alfidi's results, Rosenberg found that 73 of 
the 100 patients felt full disclosure to be desirable, but a 
full 50% of the patients said that they would have refused 
the procedure on the basis of the information provided. 
This startling result (in contrast to Alfidi's 2% of 
patients refusing angiography) is probably due to the fact 
that none of these patients were actually facing the 
necessity of having a cerebral arteriogram performed, or, 
perhaps, to the perception that the procedure would involve 
a vulnerable body part, namely, the head. 
These three studies point out the limitations in 
studying patient comprehension before physician disclosure 
is adequately assessed. In the Robinson study, it is hard 
to know how standardized the disclosures were; the 
contradictory results in the Alfidi study lead us to 
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question how much patients comprehended what was being told 
to them; and in Rosenberg's study, we are left with a 
distinct feeling that facing a "hypothetical" procedure is 
nowhere near analogous to what happens inside the mind of a 
patient facing an actual medical emergency. Because of 
these limitations, the stage had been set for an attempt to 
study both disclosure and comprehension. 
c. Studies focusing simultaneously on physician 
disclosure and patient comprehension. 
Harris (1982) 
Similar to the Rosoff study in scale and scope, this 
survey represents the first attempt to obtain a national 
composite picture of how physicians are behaving within the 
changing legal status of informed consent. 
Conducted by telephone interview, this survey, which 
was undertaken by the President's Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research and conducted by the Louis Harris 
Agency, polled a carefully drawn, nationally representative 
sample of 805 physicians and 1,251 members of the general 
public. Telephone interviews were completed with 68% of the 
eligible physicians, and 70% of the eligible households that 
were reached during the period of the study, a response rate 
significantly higher than in previous studies. 
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The design of this study differed in a few ways from 
the previous study by Rosoff, although the approach is 
primarily the same. A split format was used: that is, the 
sample was divided in half, with each half answering 
primarily the same questions, but with different ranking 
scales or answer choices. Thus, one question "In your 
practice, how often do you discuss each of the following 
things with the patient -- always, usually, sometimes, 
rarely, or never?", asked to half of the physicians became 
"In your practice, do you initiate discussion about each of 
the following things with the patient as a matter of course, 
or discuss it only if the patient asks about it?" for the 
other half. 
Another change from the Rosoff study was the expansion 
of the number of response categories from four to five 
(Always, usually, sometimes, rarely, or never) which the 
authors felt removed pressure on the physicians to answer on 
either end of a continuum. 
The results of the Harris study confirmed what was 
found by Rosoff in 1976: physicians report a very high 
level of disclosure on most items that the law mandates. 
Harris found that 98% of physicians reported disclosing the 
diagnosis and prognosis of a patient's condition; 96% 
disclose the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment 
option; and that 93% disclose negative consequences that are 
certain or fairly likely to ensue. 
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In addition, Harris asked the population sample about 
the frequency of discussion of certain treatment risks, 
which varied by probability and seriousness of outcome. For 
risks of serious disability or death that occur in 1 out of 
100 cases, 82% of physicians reported disclosure. Fifty- 
nine percent reported they commonly disclose risk of death 
or disability that occur in 1 out of 1000 cases. And, 
finally, 57% of physicians report disclosing risk of 
temporary disability that are about 1 in 1000. 
As Faden and Beauchamp (1986) have noted, the results 
of the Harris study give the impression that obtaining 
informed consent has become a routine component of American 
medical practice, particularly for invasive medical 
procedures. Significant to the present study, only blood 
tests and perscriptions were found to proceed without 
patient consent, although about half of the physicians 
reported obtaining oral consent for these also. Compared 
with the study by Hershey in 1969, we see how medical 
practice has evolved in such a short time to match the 




2. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS OF 
HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS ON ISSUES SURROUNDING AIDS. 
The second part of this literature review consists of 
an overview of the major studies looking at the behavior and 
attitudes amongst practitioners who treat AIDS patients. 
a. Studies on attitudes of health care workers. 
In July 1987, a provocative study of medical students' 
attitudes toward AIDS and homosexual patients appeared 
(Kelly et al, 1987). Medical students are often chosen as a 
study sample for investigations of health professionals' 
attitudes given their relative accessibility and willingness 
to participate. 
In this study, 119 second-year students at the 
University of Mississippi School of Medicine were presented 
with four patient vignettes, identical in content with the 
exception of the identification of each patient as having 
either AIDS or leukemia, and as either homosexual or 
heterosexual. Only one of the possible four combinations of 
patient characteristics was presented to each student. 
Students then completed a 12-item prejudicial evaluation 
scale, rating their responses on a 7-point Likert scale 
(from l=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree). 
The authors showed that medical students view AIDS 
patients in a highly negative manner, as they do homosexual 
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patients, regardless of illness. Homosexuals were viewed as 
being more responsible for their illness, (p<0.005); more 
dangerous to others, (p<0.05); and suffering less pain than 
the heterosexual patients, (p<0.05). The students believed 
that the AIDS patients were more deserving than leukemia 
patients of their illness and more deserving to die, to lose 
their jobs, and to be quarantined. 
In concluding, the authors expressed alarm at the 
degree of negativity expressed by the students toward 
certain patients, and contemplated the implications of this 
on future health care quality. 
A similar study was undertaken by Koenig & Cooke (1987) 
of UCSF, who studied the attitudes of house staff directly 
responsible for the care of AIDS patients. Medical house 
officers of the San Francisco General Hospital were 
presented with a questionnaire addressing estimation of risk 
to health care workers, anxiety elicited in the treatment of 
AIDS patients, and satisfaction in the care of AIDS 
patients. 
The results can be summarized as follows: 1. Risk - 
Sixty-eight percent of respondents felt that health care 
workers were at some risk of contracting AIDS, with the male 
respondents considerably more concerned about this 
possibility (84% vs. 48% of women). 2. Anxiety - The 
authors found that at least 80% of the medical house staff 
were "mildly anxious" about treating AIDS patients, and 20% 
labeled themselves as "very anxious". Twenty percent 
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reported dreams or nightmares about AIDS, and 18% reported 
symptoms which they felt were suspicious of AIDS. 
3. Satisfaction - Results from this category clustered 
around the mid-point of a 4-point Likert scale. The amount 
of satisfaction obtained from treating AIDS patients was 
found to be inversely proportional to the amount of AIDS 
treatment experience. Koenig and Cooke concluded with a 
call for more assistance to health care professionals in the 
stress induced by assuming their responsibilities in caring 
for patients with AIDS. 
b. Studies on physicians' behavior regarding HIV 
testing. 
Finally, the results of a study very similar to the 
present one appeared recently (Henry et al, 1988). The 
clinical use of the HIV antibody test at a single 
institution affiliated with the University of Minnesota 
Medical School was investigated, with particular attention 
paid to the whether the test was medically indicated, 
whether informed consent was obtained, and whether risk- 
reduction counseling took place. 
All of the HIV antibody tests ordered through one 
medical center from April 1985 through August 1986 were 
studied. In addition to obtaining basic demographic 
information about both doctor and patient, the investigators 
examined chart notes for documentation of consent and 
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discussion of risk-reduction. In addition, a judgement 
concerning the "appropriateness" of the testing was made, 
using Minnesota Department of Health guidelines, which 
included the presence of risk factors and completion of 
counseling and consent procedures as minimum requirements. 
Results were tabulated for all 275 patients for which 
HIV antibody tests were ordered during the data collection 
period. Certain results are particularly important to the 
current study: Fifty-eight percent of charts presented a 
rationale for the ordering of the test; Twenty-one percent 
of charts made mention of the fact that the test was 
discussed with the patient; Nine percent of charts 
documented that discussion and risk-reduction counseling had 
occurred; Three percent of charts contained a patient- 
signed consent form. Patients who had been tested while on 
a surgical service were less likely than those on a medical 
service to have a note in their chart referring to the test. 
As to the appropriateness of HIV antibody test ordering, 
only 10% of the tests were found to have been 
"appropriately" ordered, a statistic that did not vary by 
care provider characteristics (gender, race, or level of 
training). 
Unfortunately, there is no mention of what constitutes 
informed consent in the charts of patients for whom consent 
was obtained. The authors urge that the reason for ordering 
the HIV antibody test and the patient's consent need to be 
documented, but again, no mention is made of what this 
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actually means. Certainly, the mere presence of a written 
statement that consent was obtained by the ordering 
physician does not guarantee that the patient was informed 
of - or understands - the nature, risks, benefits, and 
negative consequences of the test to be employed. The goal 
of the present study is to investigate what is considered, 





Requests for HIV tests are submitted to the Yale-New 
Haven Hospital Blood Bank on a standardized order form 
(Anti-HIV, form #F-3196, Stock #66785 - See Appendix B.) 
which includes the name of the patient, the name of the 
ordering physician, the reason for the test, and the 
signature of the responsible physician certifying that 
consent has been obtained. 
Names of physicians who ordered tests between March 7, 
1988 and March 21, 1988 were obtained from the chief 
technologist, along with the date of the test, and the 
reason for the ordering of the test. As indicated on the 
test form, reasons for test ordering are divided into five 
categories, and these were obtained from the laboratory as 
#l-#4, or "other". Human Investigations Committee approval 
was requested and granted, pursuant to the stipulation that 
no patient names be recorded. 
Inhouse ordering physicians were contacted by telephone 
and asked to sit for a fifteen-minute semi-structured 
interview (Appendix A). Physicians ordering more than one 
test during the stated time period were interviewed 
regarding their most recent patient disclosure conversation. 
Interview results were compiled anonymously, tabulated, 
and analyzed using the SAS package at the Yale University 




1. PROFILE OF TESTING OVER THE SAMPLING PERIOD. 
Over the period from March 7, 1988 to March 21, 1988, a 
total of 107 HIV tests were ordered through the Yale-New 
Haven Hospital testing facility. As this laboratory 
provides testing to services to outside laboratories and 
private physicians, this total can be further subdivided 
into 46 (43%) inhouse tests ordered, and 61 (57%) outside 
test requests. 
A total of 28 inhouse physicians were responsible for 
the 46 tests ordered: of these, 20 (71%) ordered only one 
test. Four physicians ordered three or more tests during 
the testing period. 
2. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE PHYSICIAN SAMPLE. 
Of the total of 28 physicians ordering tests during the 
sampling period, 20 (71%) were interviewed. Of the eight 
physicians not interviewed, six were repeatedly unavailable, 
one did not directly obtain consent (a designated 
subordinate, whose name could not be ascertained, was 
responsible for this), and one physician's name was 
illegible as written on the test order form. 
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Tables 1 and 2 summarize the demographic 
characteristics of the study sample. In summary, the 
typical ordering physician tended to be male (70%), to be an 
internist (50%), to be a house officer (50%), to be between 
the ages of 30 and 39 (65%), and to have one to ten years of 
clinical practice experience (75%). 
3. RESULTS OF THE "SPECIFIC CASE" QUESTIONS. 
a. The reason for test ordering. 
Generally, the reason for test ordering stated by the 
physicians corresponded with the reason indicated on the 
Anti-HIV test order form (see Table 3). The categories 
listed on the order form are broad enough to cover most 
indications for ordering an HIV test. Two (10%) physicians 
described the reason as "screening", a category not 
available on the test order form. Other reasons given were: 
"...the patient had recently returned from Africa" and had 
requested testing; a "patient's partner was snorting coke" 
and the patient had requested testing; a "patient's 
boyfriend had hepatitis B" and had requested testing; and 
"testing is a criterion for participation in a research 
proj ect". 
The majority of tests were ordered in the outpatient 
setting (85%), and were commonly the first test ordered for 
that patient (85%). 
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b. The purpose of HIV testing. 
Answers to the question "was the purpose of the test 
explained; that is, what the test will actually do?" are 
found in Table 4. Only one (5%) physician reported not 
explaining the purpose of the test to the patient. The 
purpose for HIV testing most commonly explained to patients 
was to document previous exposure to the HIV (50%). Other 
purposes stated included: "to rule out the presence of the 
virus", and "this is an AIDS test". 
c. Other benefits of HIV testing. 
Five (25%) respondents reported explaining other 
benefits of HIV testing to the patient (see Table 4). Cited 
benefits included: "to put one's mind at ease"; "important 
diagnostically"; "helps narrow down diagnostic 
possibilities"; "could be important therapeutically should 
she decide to get pregnant"; and, "if positive, the patient 
could be counseled". 
d. Risks of HIV testing. 
Six (30%) of the responding physicians reported that 
they had explained the risks of HIV testing to the patient 
(see Table 4). Those risks discussed included: "the same 
risks as other blood tests"; "the uncertainty of what a 
positive result means"; "the possibility of 
discrimination"; "the possible loss of confidentiality"; 
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"the anguish over a false-positive result"; and, "possible 
changes to one's sex life". 
e. Additional information requested by the patient. 
Additional information was requested in five (25%) 
cases (see Table 4). These items requested included: "how 
long will the test take?"; "is the test confidential?"; 
"what are the alternatives?"; and, "does this mean that I 
have AIDS?". 
4. RESULTS OF THE "USUAL PRACTICE" QUESTIONS. 
The results of questions in section 4 of the survey 
instrument are found in figures 1 and 2, and in Table 5. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the frequency of disclosure of the 
suggested benefits and risks queried in section 4. For 
these purposes, answers of "always" and "usually" were 
combined as "commonly disclosed", and answers of "sometimes" 
and "never" were combined as "commonly not disclosed". 
Figures 1 and 2 show the percentage of respondents who 
reported "commonly disclosing" the listed benefits and 
risks. 
A "disclosure sum" was calculated for each respondent 
using numbers assigned to each of the four possible answers: 
"always"=3, "usually"=2, "sometimes"=l, and "never"=0. 
Thus, the "disclosure sum" for a particular physician may 
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range from 0 (where every benefit and risk was reported as 
"never" being disclosed) to 48 (where every benefit and risk 
was reported as "always" being disclosed). The "disclosure 
sums" are listed in Table 5. 
Multiple regression analysis was used to analyze the 
variance in the "disclosure sums". The predictive value of 
age, sex, clinical practice experience, HIV test ordering 
experience, and location of test ordering on the "disclosure 
sum" was assessed. None of these variables were found to 





1. FORMULATION OF THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT. 
As mentioned previously, few empirical studies of 
informed consent have attempted to discern what physicians 
are actually saying to patients in their disclosure 
conversations. Miesel and Roth (1983) noted: 
It is therefore regrettable that so few 
investigators have undertaken a study of 
these matters. Worse, however, is that 
knowledge of what patients are told is an 
antecedent condition to the knowledgeable 
study of what patients understand, how they 
make decisions, and the degree of 
voluntariness with which those decisions are 
made. It is difficult, if not impossible, 
to evaluate other aspects of informed 
consent without knowing first what patients 
are told. 
The aim of the current study is to investigate the 
nature of physician disclosure practices when ordering HIV 
antibody tests in the hospital or clinic. Three of the 
previous studies provided a methodological history whereby 
an instrument for obtaining data from physician-patient 
conversations could be formulated (Hershey, 1969; Rosoff, 
1981; and Harris, 1982). In two of these studies, Hershey 
(1969) and Rosoff (1981), a self-administered questionnaire 
was used, while in the third, Harris (1982), a telephone 
interview survey (in a format very similar to the previous 
questionnaires) was used. In two of the studies, Rosoff and 
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Harris, questions were asked regarding the frequency of 
discussion of certain items in the disclosure conversation 
using either a four-point or a five-point response scale. 
With the exception of the Harris study, all of the previous 
studies have been plagued by a small response rate, either 
because of the threatening nature of the subject explored, 
or the burden in time and effort of the particular survey 
method employed. 
Thus, it became apparent that the survey instrument 
used in the current study must meet, at a minimum, three 
goals: 1. Brevity - Given the poor response rate 
associated with long, detailed questionnaires, it seemed 
imperative to keep our questioning format concise and 
focused. Since we were interested in only a single use of 
informed consent, this could be more easily achieved; 
2. Immediacy - To prevent the introduction of error due to 
loss of recall, it was desirable to question physicians as 
soon after the disclosure conversation as possible; and 
3. Anonymity - The discussion of issues surrounding AIDS is 
a sensitive one for physicians and patients alike, and the 
information obtained must be designed so that no particular 
physician could be identified. 
Since a higher response rate was obtained through the 
use of physician interviews (Harris), and physicians would 
be more likely to recall the events of a disclosure 
conversation in an immediate interview, I decided that a 
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semi-structured interview would be the format most likely to 
quickly obtain accurate data. 
Through contact with Yale-New Haven Hospital's HIV 
testing facility, ordering physicians' names were obtained, 
and immediate contact with a request for a short interview 
made. Rather than depending on physicians to complete a 
self-administered questionnaire - a factor that, in addition 
to complicating the logistics of data collection, distorts 
the nature of the physician sample - the proposed method 
would allow physicians to make an immediate decision 
regarding participation. 
Using an interview format, I envisioned a greater 
willingness on the part of physicians to participate. In 
addition, this eliminated mailings or written documents 
linking physicians' names to data, thereby better insuring 
anonymity. The three goals of brevity, immediacy, and 
anonymity seemed best served with a semi-structured 
interview format. 
The first part of the interview, following the example 
of many previous studies, consisted of questions designed to 
gather basic demographic information on the study sample. 
As in Koenig & Cooke (1987), Rosoff (1981), and Henry et al. 
(1988), data on the physician's age, gender, specialty, 
experience, and practice type would be obtained. Previous 
differences in physician behavior patterns according to the 
gender, specialty, and experience of the physician involved, 
had been clearly demonstrated. 
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A competing goal, the anonymity of the physician, is 
threatened by questions of this type, and thus the complete 
elucidation of physician characteristics had to be avoided 
(Appendix A, section 2.). A statement guaranteeing 
confidentiality was included before the interview began to 
insure the voluntary and frank participation of the 
physician sample. 
In designing the content of the physician disclosure 
conversation itself, two pitfalls were to be avoided: the 
unnecessary prompting by the questions themselves, such that 
physicians were answering what they "ought" to have done 
rather than what they actually did; and limiting the format 
to only open-ended questions on the specific disclosure 
conversation at hand, so that no true picture of this 
particular physician's behavior for all such cases could be 
assessed. 
Therefore, the first group of questions was designed to 
discover what was relayed in a particular disclosure 
conversation to a particular patient regarding the basic 
legal components of consent (the nature and purpose, risks, 
benefits, alternatives and negative consequences of the 
proposed procedure). The physician would have the 
opportunity to relate what was actually told to this 
patient. 
Then, in a quantifiable way, several questions were 
asked on recommended components of an HIV antibody 
disclosure conversation, thereby determining the frequency 
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with which physicians included these components in their 
conversations (Appendix A, section 4.). Using a four-point 
response scale similar to Rosoff (1981), we would then be 
able to draw a picture of what components are most 
frequently considered necessary for informed consent. See 
Goldblum & Seymour (1987) for these recommended consent 
components. Correlations based on the demographic 
information gathered in section 2 could then be made with 
this data. 
Finally, a block of time would be reserved at the end 
of the interview for any additional comments that the 
physician might want to make. 
Since we could not actually study the disclosure 
conversation as it actually occurred, we were left with the 
major drawback of depending on physicians' perceptions of 
what they have told to patients. While I have no reason to 
conclude that physicians would deliberately misrepresent 
what occurred, one can not be assured, without recording the 
conversation itself, that what was obtained was accurate 
information about the content of the disclosure 
conversation. This study is therefore limited to studying 
what physicians say they did, rather than studying what they 
actually did. 
Another methodological problem is the possibility that 
those willing to participate in a short interview might not, 
in fact, be representative of the physician population at 
large. Those physicians willing to donate their time for an 
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investigation into informed consent may be biased in favor 
of providing more thorough disclosure conversations to their 
patients. 
Thus, the final survey instrument consisted of a semi- 
structured interview of three parts: 1. Demographic 
information of the respondent; 2. Open-ended questions on 
the disclosure conversation that pertained to a particular 
patient; and 3. Specific questions on the usual practice 
of the physician when obtaining consent for HIV testing. In 
this way, the broadest profile of physician behavior in 
obtaining consent for HIV testing could be studied. 
2. DISCUSSION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS. 
Although this study is meant primarily to be an 
exploratory study of the decision-making process in HIV 
testing, some conclusions can be drawn from the numerical 
survey results. 
First, the results from the "specific case" questions 
(Table 4) show a surprising underreporting of many of the 
suggested items of disclosure. Not even half of the 
interviewed physicians reported disclosing the relevant 
benefits and risks of the procedure, and few of their 
patients requested any additional information. The most 
frequently disclosed item was found to be the purpose of the 
HIV test (reported by 19 of 20 physicians), and there seemed 
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to be a fair amount of uniformity in what this was thought 
to be (50% of the disclosing physicians described the 
purpose as documenting exposure to the HIV). Contrary to 
the published advice of experts, one physician reported the 
purpose as "an AIDS test", which may lead to further 
misunderstanding on the part of the patient. 
This survey was designed so that physicians would 
spontaneously report what they considered the risks and 
benefits of HIV testing to be, before being prompted by the 
suggested risks and benefits in section 4. Some of those 
suggested items were reported by physicians as being 
disclosed to their patients: the alleviation of anxiety, 
the test's use as a diagnostic tool, the problem of false 
results, and the psychological trauma that accompanies 
testing. Still, the results of section 3 generally show 
that patients are not being made explicitly aware of the 
benefits and risks of HIV testing. It would be hard, given 
this lack of disclosure, to construe that the consent that 
patients are giving is "informed". 
The results of the "usual practice" questions show the 
same underreporting of risks and benefits as a general rule 
in the practice of these physicians. Only one suggested 
benefit of HIV testing was reported by more than half of the 
physicians interviewed (the use of the test as a diagnostic 
tool). 
One of the benefits listed, the possibility of 
protecting the staff of the hospital from infection, is not 
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one of the suggested benefits of Goldblum & Seymour (1987), 
but was asked to determine whether physicians were routinely 
ordering HIV tests for this purpose (or at least informing 
patients that they were ordering for this reason). Only 20% 
of the respondents reported commonly disclosing this 
information. Experts have advised against the use of the 
HIV test for this purpose (Bayer et al . , 1986). 
Generally, the risks of HIV testing, including the more 
catastrophic consequences of loss of employment and 
insurance, are not being disclosed. Only one risk was 
reported by more than half of the physicians as being 
commonly disclosed: the possibility that the test results 
may be false. One physician expressed the belief that the 
HIV test was a "no risk" procedure and should be performed 
without any patient consent. 
The "disclosure sum" indicates that physicians, in 
their usual practice, are underdisclosing. With an 
"average" disclosure earning a score of 24, only three of 
the 20 physicians had this score or above (see Table 5). In 
fact, the majority of physicians (65%) had scores of 14 or 
below. Again, most of the suggested benefits and risks are 
not being disclosed. 
One of the more striking general conclusions about the 
use of the HIV test at the Yale-New Haven Hospital is the 
variety of clinical situations in which the test is used and 
the implications that this has for the standard of informed 
consent. Since the test is used in inpatient and outpatient 
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settings, in research studies and clinical use, for 
specialized procedures (e.g. organ donation) and for routine 
diagnostic workups, many physicians expressed the belief 
that they were not using the test for the purpose it was 
created. The implications of this on disclosure were 
significant: many felt that full disclosure, given their 
special setting, was unwarranted. 
Not all of those interviewed were physicians. Three of 
the respondents were nurses and had received previous 
permission to sign a designated physician's name certifying 
that consent had been obtained. Given the small number 
involved, it is hard to assess how this may alter the 
consent process. One physician who had been asked for an 
interview stated that he never actually obtained the 
consent, and that there were many designated subordinates 
who were responsible for this. Whether nurses are more 
likely to disclose more information in their conversations 
is unclear from the data, but given the legal responsibility 
of the physician whose name appears on the order form, it 
would behoove physicians to be aware of and change, if 
necessary, what is being told to patients. 
Several observations on the process of decision-making 
in HIV testing can be made. First, the content of 
counseling and consent for HIV testing seem to overlap. 
What constitutes minimum disclosure for consent, many 
physicians would include in their counseling session with 
the patient (either before or after the test had been 
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ordered). Many physicians reported that some of the risks 
of testing would be disclosed or discussed upon the 
presentation of a positive result. Even though the test 
results may remain confidential, the patients, in these 
instances, are being effectively excluded from the decision¬ 
making process itself. 
Another general observation was that physicians would 
make certain assumptions about their patients' level of 
competence and understanding, and these physicians would 
base their disclosure on these assumptions. If patients are 
assumed to be incapable of understanding the ramifications 
of testing, it is ironic that less rather than more 
information is disclosed. 
Many physicians reported not disclosing the problems of 
employment and insurance because they assumed their patients 
did not have jobs or insurance to begin with. In the 
inpatient setting, where physicians may have had very little 
previous contact with their patients, physicians may 
actually know very little about their patients' job or • 
insurance status. The consequences of these assumptions may 
be devastating. Outpatient disclosures, given the above 
reasoning and perhaps more lenient time constraints, tended 
to be more complete. 
Many physicians made the comment that their patients 
had requested the test, and they adjusted their disclosure 
patterns appropriately. The more the patient had desired 
the test, the less discussion was deemed necessary. Whether 
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the physicians felt that the patients already had risk and 
benefit information available because of their demonstrated 
interest in the test, or whether they were just complying 
with their patients' wishes is not known. Yet, demonstrated 
anxiousness or willingness to be tested prompted less 
information from the physician. 
Physicians also adjusted their disclosure downward when 
they felt their patients had a low likelihood of testing 
positive. This included low-risk populations for research 
studies and organ donations. Since many of these physicians 
had not yet had to inform a patient of a positive result, 
many seemed to order the test with the assumption that the 
test result would be negative, and that, therefore, made 
disclosure of risk and benefit information unnecessary. 
Interview respondents who dealt with the HIV test for a 
specialized purpose (such as organ donation) felt that 
disclosure was necessary only for other more "routine" uses 
of the test. Some felt that I was talking to the "wrong" 
physician and should actually be speaking to a physician who 
uses the test for medical diagnosis and risk reduction 
counseling. 
Similarly, one physician expressed the idea that since 
some patients were "responsible" themselves for having the 
disease, they "deserved" less information in obtaining 
consent. Thus, the more culpable one was considered in 




A limitation of interview or questionnaire studies of 
this type was noted as the interviews progressed. An ideal 
doctor-patient relationship may not necessarily deal with 
the explicit transfer of items of information, but may 
encompass the gradual and extensive interchange which leads 
to an understanding of the patient by the physician, 
including informational needs. Thus, a greater 
understanding of the patient by the physician may require 
less explicit exchanges of information, and thus the type of 
disclosure implied by the survey instrument would be 
unnecessary. Knowledge of the patient's own feelings about 
benefits and risks and how they would affect the patient's 
life may indeed alter the level of disclosure deemed 
necessary by the physician. This is true of informed 
consent in any context. 
In this perspective, the use of standardized informed 
consent forms can be seen to be counterproductive: the 
reliance on specific items of information precludes the 
general, and often subtle, acquisition of knowledge and 
understanding about the particularities of a patient. Lack 
of disclosure, as predicted by the survey instrument in this 
study, may therefore actually denote a higher appreciation 
of the benefits and risks involved in HIV testing, and a 
greater understanding by the physician of how these may 




Since information is generally underreported to those 
patients considering HIV testing, several recommendations 
can be made to improve the quality of decisionmaking. 
First, physicians need to be aware of the relevant 
risks and benefits of HIV testing, and they also need to 
know how these items of information apply to the varied 
clinical situations in which the HIV test is used. This 
study concluded that the HIV test inhospital is being used 
for many disparate purposes. Hospital policy can encourage 
standardization of the consent process by suggesting what 
should be considered minimum disclosure. 
Given the social and political nature of some of these 
risks, it would perhaps be necessary to include non-medical 
personnel on any committee designed to set up a policy for 
informed consent in the context of HIV testing. 
Sociologists, social workers, clergy, and others will be 
more acquainted with the various social and psychological 
consequences of HIV seropositivity. Physicians can readily 
benefit from their expertise in these areas, and thus better 
inform their patients of the real risks of testing. 
Educational programs can be designed to acquaint physicians 
with the results of such policy decisions. 
Accurate documentation of the consent process is 
integral to maintaining adequate levels of disclosure. 
Physicians should not merely record the fact that consent 
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has been obtained, but should outline what relevant issues 
were discussed. Quality control policies can be implemented 
that would monitor the level of disclosure by physicians. 
Self-education regarding the indications and uses of 
the HIV test remains the cornerstone for altering the 
decisionmaking process. Physicians need to commit 
themselves to understanding the ramifications of HIV testing 
as it evolves over time. 
Finally, government institutions need to be made aware 
of how the HIV test is being used in clinical settings, and 
to address their recommendations accordingly. Physicians 
need to be able to rely on realistic and concrete 
suggestions for improving the HIV test ordering process. 
Without direction, physicians will substitute their own 
ideas for what should be done, rather than relying on policy 
formulated by national experts in the field. 
Standardization can be achieved by bringing recommendations 
for physician behavior into line with the realities of 
clinical practice. 







of the study sample: The gender, age, 
specialty of the interviewed subjects. 
and 







Age No (%) 
20-29 4 (20%) 
30-39 13 (65%) 
40-49 1 (5%) 
50-59 1 (5%) 
>59 1 (5%) 
Clinical Specialty No. (%) 
Internal Medicine 10 (50%) 
Obstetrics/gynecology 3 (15%) 
Nursing 3 (15%) 
Surgery 2 (10%) 
Dermatology 1 (5%) 




Demographics of the study sample: The hospital affiliation, 
clinical experience, and HIV test ordering experience of the 
interviewed subjects. 
Affiliation No. m 
House Officer 10 (50%) 
Faculty 7 (35%) 
Registered Nurse 3 (15%) 
Experience Level No. m 
0 - 10 years 15 (75%) 
11- 20 years 2 (10%) 
21- 30 years 2 (10%) 
31- 40 years 1 (5%) 
Range 1-40 years 
Mean 9.2 years 
HIV test ordering experience No. L%1 
0 - 10 tests 9 (45%) 
11- 20 tests 4 (20%) 
21- 50 tests 3 (15%) 
> 50 tests 4 (20%) 







Table 3 . 
Specific case questions: The reason for the test, the 
previous HIV testing history, and the origination of the 
test sample for the patient in question. 
Reason (from Anti-HIV form) No. m 
Differential Diagnosis of Symptoms 
Asymptomatic outpatient for counseling 








HIV testing history No. (%) 
No previous testing 17 (85%) 
Previously tested 3 (15%) 





-'-Listed under this category: "history of 
transfusion","needle stick","acute hepatitis","donor 




Specific Case Questions: 
1. "Was the purpose of the test explained to the patient; 
that is, what the test will actually 'do?" 
Answer No. (%) 
Yes 19 (95%) 
No 1 (5%) 
2. "Were other benefits of having the test performed 
explained?" 
Answer No- (%) 
Yes 5 (25%) 
No 15 (75%) 
3. "Were the risks of the test explained?" 
Answer No- (%) 
Yes 6 (30%) 
No 14 (70%) 
4. "Did the patient request any additional information?" 
Answer No. m 
Yes 5 (25%) 




"Disclosure Sum": A Measure of Physician Disclosure in HIV 
Testing. 1 
"Disclosure Sum" No. (%) 
0 - 8 6 (30%) 
g _ 16 9 (45%) 
17 - 24 3 (15%) 
25 - 32 2 (10%) 
33 - 40 0 (0%) 
41 - 48 0 (0%) 
O 
Lowest possible disclosure sum -0^ 
Highest possible disclosure sum - 48^ 
Mean possible disclosure sum - 244 
Mean disclosure sum of interviewed physicians - 13.9 
-*-The "disclosure sum" equals the sum of reported frequencies 
of disclosure of suggested benefits and risks of HIV 
testing, where Always=3, Usually=2, Sometimes=l, and 
Never=0. See Appendix A, section 4. 
■^Calculated as reporting "never" for each item of 
disclosure: (0 x 16 = 0). 
^Calculated as reporting "always" for each item of 
disclosure: (3 x 16 = 48). 
^Calculated as the mean of the lowest and highest possible 
disclosure sum: (0 + 48 = 48/2 = 24). 
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Figure 1. The percentage of respondents reporting 
"commonly disclosing" the suggested benefits of HIV testing. 
Responses to questions in section 4 of the survey instrument 
of "always" and "usually" have been grouped together as 
"commonly disclosed" and appear on the abscissa. The 
suggested benefits of Goldblum and Seymour (1987) appear on 
the ordinate: 
1. Supporting or confirming a medical diagnosis. 
2. Protecting the staff of the hospital from 
infection. 
3. Reducing anxiety. 
4. Motivating individuals to modify behavior. 
5. Helping scientists to determine the extent of HIV 
infection. 
6. Helping researchers to design experimental 
treatments. 
7. Helping women at high risk to decide whether to 
become pregnant. 
8. Helping women decide whether to breast-feed an 
infant, or to have an infant vaccinated. 
9. Protecting the blood supply. 
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Figure 2. The percentage of respondents reporting 
"commonly disclosing" the suggested risks of HIV testing. 
Responses to questions in section 4 of the survey instrument 
of "always" and "usually" have been grouped together as 
"commonly disclosed" and appear on the abscissa. The 
suggested risks of Goldblum and Seymour (1987) appear on the 
ordinate: 
1. Proving falsely positive or falsely negative. 
2. Causing severe psychological reactions. 
3. Disrupting personal relationships. 
4. Causing problems with employment. 
5. Causing problems with insurance. 
6. Causing a false sense of security and denial if the 














































A. APPENDIX A — THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW. 
1. STATEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
This interview is completely voluntary and 
confidential. There are no markings or other devices by 
which I can identify any interview as coming from a 
particular physician. Your name will not be recorded. You 
are free to refuse to answer any question, or to terminate 
this interview at any time, and this will in no way affect 
your relationships with Yale-New Haven Hospital or Yale 
Medical School. I am not affiliated with either the 
laboratory performing these tests or any official of the 
YNHH medical center. 
Please remember that it is the communication that you 
consider necessary for informed consent that I am interested 
in, and not risk reduction or other counseling information 
that you may convey to patients in the course of anti-HIV 
testing. 
2. DEMOGRAPHICS 
A. What is your age? (I am recording the decade 
only.) 
B. How are you affiliated with YNHH? (HO, Faculty, 
Private MD only.) 
C. What is your specialty? 
D. How many years have you been in practice? 
E. Have you ordered the HIV antibody test previously? 
F. Approximately how many times? 
G. Is this a first or repeat test for this patient? 
H. Was this patient an inpatient or an outpatient? 
I. Remember to record the person's age. 
3. SPECIFIC CASE QUESTIONS 
I am now going to ask some questions about the specific 
case for which you obtained consent. These questions will 
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apply to your conversation with this patient before the HIV 
test was ordered. 
A. What was the reason that the test was ordered for 
this patient? 
B. Was the purpose of the test explained; that is, 
what the test will actually do? 
C. What did you communicate to the patient regarding 
the purpose of the anti-HIV test? 
D. Were other benefits of having the test performed 
explained? 
E. What did you communicate to the patient regarding 
the benefits of the HIV test? 
F. Were the risks of the test explained? 
G. What did you communicate to the patient regarding 
the risks of the HIV test? 
H. Did the patient request any additional information? 
4. USUAL PRACTICE QUESTIONS 
I am now going to read a list of possible benefits and 
risks that can accrue from having the HIV antibody test 
performed. Drawing on all of the cases for which you have 
ordered the test, please tell the frequency with which you 
include the particular benefit or risk when you obtain 
consent. The ranking is: 
Always Usually Sometimes Never 
When you obtain consent, how often do you say "Testing for 
HIV antibody may help:" 
1. to support or confirm a medical diagnosis. 
2. to help protect the staff of the hospital and 
others from infection. 
3. to reduce anxiety. 
4. to motivate individuals to modify behavior. 
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5. to help scientists determine the extent of HIV 
infection. 
6. to help researchers design experimental 
treatment. 
7. to help women at high risk decide whether to 
become pregnant. 
8. to help women decide whether to breast-feed an 
infant, or to have an infant vaccinated. 
9. to protect the blood supply. 
10. to ensure that organ donations are safe. 
When you obtain consent for HIV testing, how often do you 
say, "Testing for HIV carries the risk of:" 
1. proving falsely positive or falsely negative. 
2. causing severe psychological reactions. 
3. disrupting interpersonal relations. 
4. causing problems with employment. 
5. causing problems with insurance. 
6. causing a false sense of security and denial 
if the test proves negative. 
















































B. APPENDIX B THE HIV TEST ORDER FORM. 
ANTI-HIV - TEST CANNOT BE DONE WITHOUT COMPLETED SIGNED REQUEST 
DATE:_^___ 
AGE:_SEX:_ 
M.D ORDERING TEST: (PRINT) 
INDICATE REASON FOR TEST: 
□ DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF SYMPTOMS. 
□ ASYMPTOMATIC OUTPATIENT FOR COUNSELING 
□ ASYMPTOMATIC INPATIENT FOR COUNSELING OR INFECTION CONTROL 
□ ORGAN/BLOOD/TISSUE/SPERM DONOR 
BILLING/REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS IF REQUIRED 
□ OTHER 
HAS PATIENT OR GUARDIAN CONSENTED? □ YES □ NO 
IF NO, WHY? 
— 
IS CONSENT DOCUMENTED IN MEDICAL RECORD? □ YES □ NO 
YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN SIGNATURE ONLY_ 
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